Russia-Ukraine: Cease Fire
Russia-Ukraine: Cease Fire
Putin wants Ukraine ceasefire on frontlines, Defining Success in Ukraine, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks.
Putin wants Ukraine ceasefire on frontlines
By Guy Faulconbridge and Andrew Osborn (Reuters)
Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready to halt the war in Ukraine with a negotiated ceasefire that recognises the current battlefield lines, four Russian sources told Reuters, saying he is prepared to fight on if Kyiv and the West do not respond.
Three of the sources, familiar with discussions in Putin's entourage, said the veteran Russian leader had expressed frustration to a small group of advisers about what he views as Western-backed attempts to stymie negotiations and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's decision to rule out talks.
"Putin can fight for as long as it takes, but Putin is also ready for a ceasefire – to freeze the war," said another of the four, a senior Russian source who has worked with Putin and has knowledge of top level conversations in the Kremlin.
He, like the others cited in this story, spoke on condition of anonymity given the matter's sensitivity. For this account, Reuters spoke to a total of five people who work with or have worked with Putin at a senior level in the political and business worlds. The fifth source did not comment on freezing the war at the current frontlines.
Asked about the Reuters report at a news conference in Belarus on Friday, Putin said peace talks should restart.
"Let them resume," he said, adding that negotiations should be based on "the realities on the ground" and on a plan agreed during a previous attempt to reach a deal in the first weeks of the war. "Not on the basis of what one side wants," he said.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said on X that the Russian leader was trying to derail a Ukrainian-initiated peace summit in Switzerland next month by using his entourage to send out "phony signals" about his alleged readiness to halt the war.
"Putin currently has no desire to end his aggression against Ukraine. Only the principled and united voice of the global majority can force him to choose peace over war," said Kuleba.
Mykhailo Podolyak, a Ukrainian presidential adviser, said Putin wanted Western democracies to accept defeat.
NOT "ETERNAL WAR"
The appointment last week of economist Andrei Belousov as Russia's defence minister was seen by some Western military and political analysts as placing the Russian economy on a permanent war footing in order to win a protracted conflict.
It followed sustained battlefield pressure and territorial advances by Russia in recent weeks. However, the sources said that Putin, re-elected in March for a new six-year term, would rather use Russia's current momentum to put the war behind him. They did not directly comment on the new defence minister.
Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov, in response to a request for comment, said the country did not want “eternal war.”
Based on their knowledge of conversations in the upper ranks of the Kremlin, two of the sources said Putin was of the view that gains in the war so far were enough to sell a victory to the Russian people.
Europe's biggest ground conflict since World War Two has cost tens of thousands of lives on both sides and led to sweeping Western sanctions on Russia's economy.
Three sources said Putin understood any dramatic new advances would require another nationwide mobilisation, which he didn't want, with one source, who knows the Russian president, saying his popularity dipped after the first mobilisation in September 2022.
The national call up spooked part of the population in Russia, triggering hundreds of thousands of draft age men to leave the country. Polls showed Putin’s popularity falling by several points.
Peskov said Russia had no need for mobilisation and was instead recruiting volunteer contractors to the armed forces.
The prospect of a ceasefire, or even peace talks, currently seems remote.
Zelenskiy has repeatedly said peace on Putin's terms is a non-starter. He has vowed to retake lost territory, including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. He signed a decree in 2022 that formally declared any talks with Putin "impossible."
One of the sources predicted no agreement could happen while Zelenskiy was in power, unless Russia bypassed him and struck a deal with Washington. However, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, speaking in Kyiv last week, told reporters he did not believe Putin was interested in serious negotiations.
SWISS TALKS
The Swiss peace summit in June is aimed at unifying international opinion on how to end the war. The talks were convened at the initiative of Zelenskiy who has said Putin should not attend. Switzerland has not invited Russia.
Moscow has said the talks are not credible without it being there. Ukraine and Switzerland want Russian allies including China to attend.
Speaking in China on May 17, Putin said Ukraine may use the Swiss talks to get a broader group of countries to back Zelenskiy’s demand for a total Russian withdrawal, which Putin said would be an imposed condition rather than a serious peace negotiation.
The Swiss foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
In response to questions for this story, a U.S. State Department spokesperson said any initiative for peace must respect Ukraine’s “territorial integrity, within its internationally recognised borders” and described Russia as the sole obstacle to peace in Ukraine.
“The Kremlin has yet to demonstrate any meaningful interest in ending its war, quite the opposite,” the spokesperson said.
Kyiv says Putin, whose team repeatedly denied he was planning a war before invading Ukraine in 2022, cannot be trusted to honour any deal.
Both Russia and Ukraine have also said they fear the other side would use any ceasefire to re-arm.
Kyiv and its Western backers are banking on a $61 billion U.S. aid package and additional European military aid to reverse what Zelenskiy described to Reuters this week as "one of the most difficult moments" of the full scale war.
As well as shortages of ammunition after U.S. delays in approving the package, Ukraine has admitted it is struggling to recruit enough troops and last month lowered the age for men who can be drafted to 25 from 27.
TERRITORY
Putin's insistence on locking in any battlefield gains in a deal is non-negotiable, all of the sources suggested.
Putin would, however, be ready to settle for what land he has now and freeze the conflict at the current front lines, four of the sources said.
"Putin will say that we won, that NATO attacked us and we kept our sovereignty, that we have a land corridor to Crimea, which is true," one of them said, giving their own analysis.
Freezing the conflict along current lines would leave Russia in possession of substantial chunks of four Ukrainian regions he formally incorporated into Russia in September 2022, but without full control of any of them.
Such an arrangement would fall short of the goals Moscow set for itself at the time, when it said the four of Ukraine's regions - Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson - now belonged to it in their entirety.
Peskov said that there could be no question of handing back the four regions which were now permanently part of Russia according to its own constitution.
Another factor playing into the Kremlin chief's view that the war should end is that the longer it drags on, the more battle-hardened veterans return to Russia, dissatisfied with post-war job and income prospects, potentially creating tensions in society, said one of the sources, who has worked with Putin.
'RUSSIA WILL PUSH FURTHER'
In February, three Russian sources told Reuters the United States rejected a previous Putin suggestion of a ceasefire to freeze the war. In the absence of a ceasefire, Putin wants to take as much territory as possible to ratchet up pressure on Ukraine while seeking to exploit unexpected opportunities to acquire more, three of the sources said.
Russian forces control around 18% of Ukraine and this month thrust into the northeastern region of Kharkiv.
Putin is counting on Russia's large population compared to Ukraine to sustain superior manpower even without a mobilisation, bolstered by unusually generous pay packets for those who sign up.
"Russia will push further," the source who has worked with Putin said.
Putin will slowly conquer territories until Zelenskiy comes up with an offer to stop, the person said, saying the Russian leader had expressed the view to aides that the West would not provide enough weapons, sapping Ukraine's morale.
U.S. and European leaders have said they will stand by Ukraine until its security sovereignty is guaranteed. NATO countries and allies say they are trying to accelerate deliveries of weapons.
“Russia could end the war at any time by withdrawing its forces from Ukraine, instead of continuing to launch brutal attacks against Ukraine’s cities, ports, and people every day,” the State Department said in response to a question about weapons supplies.
All five sources said Putin had told advisers he had no designs on NATO territory, reflecting his public comments on the matter. Two of the sources cited Russian concerns about the growing danger of escalation with the West, including nuclear escalation, over the Ukraine standoff.
The State Department said the United States had not adjusted its nuclear posture, nor seen any sign that Russia was preparing to use a nuclear weapon.
“We continue to monitor the strategic environment and remain ready,” the spokesperson said.
Defining Success in Ukraine
By Richard Haass (Project Syndicate)
Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Adviser, has expressed the view that 2025 could be the time for Ukraine to once again mount a counter-offensive against Russian troops. Given the strategic math, that would be a serious mistake.
Three months ago, I wrote a column titled “Will Ukraine Survive?” The answer (thankfully) for the next year is “yes,” owing to Ukraine’s willingness to fight and sacrifice and the resumption of substantial US military aid.
At the same time, Russia has launched a new offensive in the northeast that threatens Kharkiv (Ukraine’s second-largest city), is girding for a protracted war, and has largely reconstituted its forces. This raises an important question: With the new tranche of aid in hand, what should Ukraine and its backers in the West seek to achieve? What should constitute success?
Some answer that success should be defined as Ukraine recovering all of its lost territory, to re-establish its 1991 borders. US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has expressed the view that 2025 could be the time for Ukraine to once again mount a counter-offensive against Russian troops.
This would be a serious mistake. Don’t get me wrong: re-establishing rightful, legal borders would be highly desirable, demonstrating that aggression is not acceptable. But foreign policy must be doable as well as desirable, and Ukraine simply is not in a position to liberate Crimea and its eastern regions through military force.
The math is unavoidable. Russia has too many soldiers and a wartime economy capable of producing large amounts of arms and ammunition. Despite sanctions, Russia has been able to ramp up its military-industrial base and has access to weaponry and ammunition produced in Iran and North Korea and to Chinese manufactured goods and technologies that contribute to the Kremlin’s war effort.
Another factor militating against a Ukraine effort to recapture its lands by force is that offensive operations tend to require much more in the way of manpower, equipment, and ammunition than do defensive efforts. This is especially so when defenses have had the chance to build fortifications, as Russia has in much of the Ukrainian territory it occupies.
The likely result of Ukraine returning to the offensive would be a massive loss of soldiers, something the already short-handed Ukrainian military can ill afford. The limited military equipment and ammunition Ukraine has access to would be quickly depleted, in the process making it more difficult to defend areas currently under Ukraine’s control. A failed Ukrainian offensive would also give new talking points to those in Western capitals skeptical of providing any assistance to Ukraine, viewing such aid as wasteful.
What strategy, then, should Ukraine and its supporters pursue? First, Ukraine should emphasize the defensive, an approach that would allow it to husband its limited resources and frustrate Russia.
Second, Ukraine should be given the means (long-range strike capabilities) and the freedom to attack Russian forces anywhere in Ukraine, as well as Russian warships in the Black Sea and economic targets within Russia itself. Russia must come to feel the cost of a war it initiated and prolongs.
Third, Ukraine’s backers must commit to providing long-term military aid. The goal of all of the above is to signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin that time is not on Russia’s side and that he cannot hope to outlast Ukraine.
Ukraine and its supporters should do one more thing: propose an interim cease-fire agreement along existing lines.
Putin will likely reject such a proposal, but his doing so should make it less difficult to win debates in the United States over providing assistance to Ukraine, as it will expose Russia as the party responsible for the continuation of the war. It might even provide a context in which US military aid to Ukraine would continue should Donald Trump retake the presidency in November.
This combination of a shift to defense, deep strikes, continued Western military assistance, and a diplomatic effort that exposes Russia for the aggressor that it is, might over time persuade Putin to accept an interim ceasefire. Under such an agreement, neither country would be asked to give up its long-term claims.
Ukraine could continue to seek the return of all its territory; Russia could continue to claim Ukraine has no right to exist as a sovereign state. Both sides could continue to rearm. Sanctions could remain in place. Ukraine could explore closer connections to both the European Union and NATO.
Ukraine would no doubt resist elements of this approach. But the US and Ukraine’s other supporters should insist on it. Ukraine cannot demand unconditional support any more than any other strategic partner. A renewed counter-offensive would fail while undermining Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. What Ukraine would gain from an interim ceasefire is an opportunity to begin rebuilding the country, as money and investment will not become available so long as the country remains an active war zone.
An interim ceasefire almost certainly would not lead to anything resembling peace, which will likely have to wait for the arrival of a Russian leadership that chooses to end the country’s pariah status. That might not happen for years or decades. In the meantime, though, Ukraine would be much better off than it would be if the war continued.
Such arrangements – non-permanent, less than formal peace – have worked well in other contexts, including on the Korean Peninsula and in Cyprus. They do not represent solutions, but they are preferable to the alternatives. And even if Russia rejects any ceasefire, as could well prove to be the case, Ukraine would be better off with a military and diplomatic strategy that protects the country’s core, preserves its independence, and maintains external support. Ukraine’s friends ought to keep this in mind before they define success in a manner that sets the country up to fail.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks
By The Ministry Affairs of the Russian Federation
I am pleased to have the chance to once again take part in an Assembly of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP). I would like to ask the head of this esteemed body not to be surprised by me striving to attend each year.
It is not a duty, but a pleasure to align our agendas, to share with you the direction our intellectual efforts are headed, and to get an update about the ideas that continually emerge within our expert community, the CFDP, in particular.
We are now at the starting point of another domestic political cycle following the presidential election. Our people have once again shown profound confidence in President Vladimir Putin and his policies, including foreign policy. Without a doubt, this fact puts our Ministry under significant obligations. We are working through the steps that are needed to continue to implement the revised Russian Foreign Policy Concept approved in March 2023. I want to emphasise from the start, though, that we will maintain the continuity of our country's foreign policy, including its key goals, objectives, and priorities. We are operating in challenging circumstances, which I don’t need to elaborate on.
The US-led West sticks to its official goal proclaimed even at the doctrinal level of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia. This includes military defeat and more. The very existence of our country is seen by many most aggressive Russophobes as a threat to the Washington-led golden billion’s global dominance. Just like everyone in this audience, we are following what the Western think tanks are doing as they develop scenarios to inflict maximum damage on us and call for supplying Kiev with ever-new types of weaponry. They are now officially, at the level of government members, talking about the possibility of targeting any part of Russia’s territory. At least, they say “it’s up to Kiev to decide.” The latest remarks on this matter by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, among others, are well known. These hawks undoubtedly insist that their governments increase investment in the defence industry and put the economy on a war footing, and fantasise about “decolonising” Russia (in plain Russian it means dismembering our country).
It’s hard to figure out who is fomenting whom. Are political analysts instigating politicians, or is it the other way round. Quite recently, on May 2, London's Chatham House convened a conference which focused entirely on seizing Russian frozen assets in the West. Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland set the tone. We interacted more than once with her when she served as the Foreign Minister. Speaking at the conference, she promoted the idea that seizing these funds was a necessary and politically and morally justified step to save Ukraine and preserve the rules-based order. She stressed the importance of creating a precedent where the aggressor pays.
Along the same lines, a discussion, Russia’s Rupture, was held on April 25 at the Jamestown Foundation with activists from the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum, which is openly supported by the United States, speaking there. The way these discussions are held shows that the acute phase of the military-political confrontation with the West continues and, if I may put it this way, is in full swing.
As for anti-Russia rhetoric, a special zeal in this regard is being displayed by our European neighbours. Everyone has heard remarks on an “inevitable war with Russia” by Emmanuel Macron, David Cameron, Josep Borrell, and others. I remember an article by Dmitry Trenin (who is present here), in which he said that Europe as a partner was irrelevant for us for at least one generation. I cannot but agree with him. We are experiencing this in practice almost every day. It must be admitted that many facts (as distinct from our sensations) speak in favour of this forecast. We think that this forecast is correct.
After the failure of the notorious Ukrainian counteroffensive, the West has been promoting a new and openly false point that “Putin will not stop at Ukraine.” Before the special military operation they said: Let us accept Ukraine to NATO as soon as possible and then Vladimir Putin will not dare to put into practice his plans with regard to that country. This means they proceeded from the assumption that NATO membership was something “sacred” and that Russia would never play rough towards this “holiness.” Today, they are saying the opposite: Putin will defeat Ukraine and then attack NATO. Therefore, “we” must urgently arm ourselves to the teeth.
Their current policy is to restore the strength of European armies and put NATO’s military industries on wartime footing. They have started the work, mental work so far, on an outline of a European nuclear-based military alliance.
France is the most active NATO member in this sense. Mr Macron admitted in an interview the other day that Paris and Berlin had always regarded Russia as the “main threat.” Obviously, they share an illusion in respect of 1812 and 1941. These capitals always saw this threat.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg claimed that the alliance had been at war with Russia since 2014. The European Parliament’s April 2024 resolution on Russia also urged the European governments to refrain from recognising Vladimir Putin as a legitimate president and curtail all contacts with him aside from humanitarian issues and “peace in Ukraine.” This resolution that shapes the political and legal reality of our coexistence with the EU (for all the reservations about the European Parliament’s role and its real role in politics) was supported by 493 deputies with 11 “nays” and 18 abstentions. These are tell-tale figures. We certainly take all these figures and other factors into account as we chart our practical policies in the Western sector.
We remain committed to the goals set by the President not only with regard to the special military operation, but also with regard to ensuring Russia’s rightful place in global politics.
Our approach will be to continue using diplomatic means to create proper conditions for the West to drop its hostile policies, and to help achieve the special military operation’s objectives. This will be the primary focus of our diplomacy.
According to President Vladimir Putin, we are open to a dialogue with the West on security and strategic stability, among other issues. However, this dialogue must rely on equal terms and with mutual respect for each other’s interests, rather than a position of power or exceptionalism. This dialogue should address the entire range of issues related to strategic stability and the broader military-political landscape.
The West, especially the United States, tends to isolate one aspect of strategic stability and claim that Russia is being uncooperative and non-constructive. For example, they have long focused on resuming inspections of our nuclear facilities, despite maintaining a hostility that contradicts the principles of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty which included mutual inspections.
Despite the intensity and high media profile of our confrontation with the West, Russia does not limit its foreign relations to a single area. Otherwise, we would not be a great power. In the current situation, it is crucial for us to develop cooperation with the Global Majority, which is not willing to sacrifice its mutually beneficial relationships with us that are based on historical memory in order to accommodate the West’s geopolitical ambitions in Ukraine.
Our relations with Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America in various formats remain our foreign policy priority. We share much with the Global Majority, including a common vision for a multipolar world and a commitment to fundamental principles of country-to-country relations, including the main one – the sovereign equality of states.
President Vladimir Putin recently visited China. This was his first foreign visit since being re-elected. The negotiations with Chinese President Xi Jinping and meetings with other Chinese leaders reaffirmed that our comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction surpass traditional alliances of the past era and continue to play a key role in maintaining international security and balanced global development.
I have read the materials drafted by some CFDP members, including reflections on what constitutes “true alliance” in our times, an alliance that aligns with Russia’s interests. This issue deserves a special discussion. We are willing to debate and discuss the ideas from these articles that are aimed at building a genuine alliance with China.
According to the assessment provided by our leaders, our relations are so close and friendly that they exceed the quality of classic alliances of the past. This assessment fully reflects the meaning of ties between Russia and China, which are getting stronger across virtually all areas.
Our actions in China and other non-Western directions evoke undisguised anger from the former hegemon and its satellites. Just look at how the United States and its allies are trying by all means to prevent Global Majority countries from dealing with Russia and to embroil them into anti-Russia initiatives, such as holding a “peace conference on Ukraine” in Switzerland. We will discuss this in more detail as well. Their goal is straightforward and is to gather as many participants as possible to create a crowd and say that Zelensky’s “peace formula” is the only acceptable plan for everyone. Next, they plan to impose it on Russia which fact they are not hiding. Vladimir Zelensky, Andrey Yermak, and many representatives from the G7 countries, who co-sponsored this conference alongside Ukraine, have expressed this view.
President Putin covered this yesterday at a news conference in Harbin. We are surprised to observe these efforts, where grown-up people engage in blatant nonsense which has no promise whatsoever. I doubt they don’t realise this, which means their goal is not to achieve peace but to turn as many countries as possible against Russia and then take further hostile steps against us. All our Global South partners understand what’s at stake. We can come back to it later and elaborate on the nuances in the positions of various Global Majority countries.
We read the West persisting in imposing Zelensky’s formula while simultaneously boosting the supplies of longer-range weapons to Kiev as a telltale sign that the West is not ready for serious talks. This means they have made their choice to resolve matters on the battlefield. We are ready for this turn of events at any time.
No matter what, Russia will successfully uphold its interests in the Ukrainian, Western, and European areas. Practically all our foreign colleagues with whom we interact realise this. I’m not sure what’s on the mind of our Western “colleagues” who surprise us with new epiphanies on a daily basis. Recently, after the UN Security Council adopted a resolution for a ceasefire in Gaza during the holy month of Ramadan, US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield stated that the resolution was not binding.
We will continue to keep consistently working to build new international balances, mechanisms, and instruments that serve the interests of Russia and its partners in line with the realities of a multipolar world. In a recent interview, Sergey Karaganov elaborated on the importance of such efforts. We have some thoughts on this matter and would be happy to share them with you and hear what you think about them.