Heart of Darkness

The security situation in the Central African Republic remained volatile. While security incidents have decreased, armed groups continue to occupy the provinces and mountains.

Feb 21, 2024

Tomorrow morning (21 February), the Security Council will hold an open briefing and closed consultations on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR). Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the CAR and Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) Valentine Rugwabiza is the anticipated briefer.

Rugwabiza is expected to describe the latest developments in the CAR based on the Secretary-General’s most recent report on MINUSCA, which was circulated to Council members on 16 February and covers developments since 16 October 2023 (S/2024/170). She may focus on the political situation in the country following the promulgation of a new constitution on 30 August 2023. The Secretary-General’s report notes that CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra has proposed dialogue initiatives with political opposition and armed group leaders. Some of these actors expressed willingness to participate in the proposed dialogue, while others declined, among other matters, because of their reluctance to legitimise the new constitution.

The Secretary-General’s report indicates increasing concerns over the shrinking political space in the country following measures taken against opposition leaders. In this regard, it mentions the arrest of opposition parliament member Ephrem Dominique Yandocka because of his alleged involvement in a coup plot—an accusation that his party, Initiative pour une transformation par l’action, has rejected. The report also refers to the cabinet reshuffle on 4 January, which saw the appointment of several new ministers, and notes concerns expressed by opposition parties, which view the reshuffle as rewarding those who played a key role in the Republican Dialogue in March 2022 that paved the way to the constitutional referendum in July 2023. In this context, Rugwabiza may note tomorrow that MINUSCA has continued to use its good offices role with the aim of promoting inclusive dialogue and advancing the peace process in the CAR.

At tomorrow’s meeting, Rugwabiza is likely to describe ongoing efforts to facilitate the implementation of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR. The Secretary-General’s report mentions the government’s engagement with armed group leaders based in Chad in November 2023 to encourage them to join the peace process. It also elaborates on MINUSCA’s role in organising dialogue in the various prefectures among community leaders and armed group members to support local-level peace efforts and to facilitate the free movement of people and goods. Rugwabiza may speak about preparations for local elections and MINUSCA’s advocacy to promote women’s meaningful participation in the electoral process. The first round of local elections is scheduled for 13 October and the second round for 26 January 2025, but a budget shortfall remains a major challenge. In this regard, Rugwabiza might reiterate tomorrow the UN’s appeal to bilateral and international partners to provide financial support to facilitate this process.

Another expected focus of tomorrow’s meeting is the difficult security conditions in the CAR. According to the Secretary-General’s report, the security situation in the country remained volatile with the start of the dry season in November 2023. It says that while the number of security incidents has decreased compared to the previous reporting period, armed groups have maintained their presence in the country’s northeast, northwest, and southeast and have continued to attack civilians and the CAR armed forces (FACA). The report describes armed clashes around mining sites between FACA and “other security personnel”—a term used by the UN to refer to the Wagner Group, a Russian private security company—on the one hand, and other armed groups, including those affiliated with the leading rebel coalition known as the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC), on the other. The report outlines the difficult security landscape in the CAR that continues to affect both civilians and international personnel in the country. This includes the targeting of civilians and the displacement of thousands of people, the targeting of minority communities in the context of intercommunal violence, continued threats posed by explosive ordnance, the kidnapping of international mine workers, attacks against humanitarian workers, and obstructions to humanitarian access observed during the reporting period.

Rugwabiza may elaborate on MINUSCA’s continued efforts to enhance its robust posture, including by conducting joint patrols with the FACA, in order to deter the activities of armed groups with the aim of protecting civilians and humanitarian workers as well as facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. She might highlight the challenge posed to MINUSCA by unidentified drones that have flown over its bases in several locations, forcing the mission to strengthen security measures. Rugwabiza might also describe MINUSCA’s support to the CAR government in expanding state authority and reforming its security sector through the training of its military personnel. She may also welcome the finalisation of the government’s ten-year action plan to operationalise the national border management policy.

At tomorrow’s meeting, several Council members are likely to express concern about human rights violations and abuses in the CAR. The period covered by the Secretary-General’s report saw a 30 percent increase in such violations and abuses, including grave violations against children and conflict-related sexual violence, largely committed by armed groups, particularly those affiliated with the CPC, and other unidentified perpetrators. Rugwabiza might note that Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten visited the CAR between 13 and 17 November 2023 and held discussions with the country’s authorities on preventing conflict-related sexual violence. She may also describe MINUSCA’s ongoing efforts to prevent grave violations against children, including their recruitment and use. (The six grave violations, as determined by the Security Council, are child recruitment and use; killing and maiming; rape and other forms of sexual violence; attacks on schools and hospitals; abductions; and the denial of humanitarian access.)

The human rights situation in the CAR has been a divisive issue in the Council, in part because some members have been critical of the Wagner Group’s alleged involvement in human rights abuses in the country. One contentious issue during the negotiations on resolution 2709 of 15 November 2023, which most recently expanded MINUSCA’s mandate, was the fact that the annual report on the human rights situation in the CAR, which is produced by MINUSCA’s human rights division, was not released in time for the mandate renewal negotiations. Resolution 2709 therefore requests that the next report be available before the next mandate renewal negotiations in November.

The implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) has been another controversial issue in the Council. Four SOFA violations, including the obstruction of entry and confiscation of passports of some UN contractors, were recorded during the period covered by the Secretary-General’s report, compared with three in the previous reporting period. At tomorrow’s meeting, Rugwabiza is likely to explain MINUSCA’s continued efforts to resolve these issues in consultation with the host government.

The Secretary-General’s report notes a new circular issued by the CAR government on 22 December 2023, “revoking standing procedures on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the Central African territory and reinforcing controls on them, including suspending their use and prohibiting night flights, effectively grounding MINUSCA’s unmanned aerial vehicles”. Tomorrow, some Council members may express concern about the new circular, and call on the CAR authorities to lift these restrictions and to take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety, security, and freedom of movement of MINUSCA’s personnel with unhindered and immediate access throughout the country.

Some Council members are likely to continue stressing the need to ensure accountability and justice in the CAR. In this regard, they may welcome some of the latest developments described in the Secretary-General’s report, including the resumption of criminal hearings by the Bangui Court Martial after a two-year hiatus. The Special Criminal Court —a hybrid court composed of national and international judges with the authority to investigate, prosecute, and try serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the CAR—also launched the trial of its second case, which relates to ten individuals accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 2020.

Another issue of interest for Council members is the work of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee. Russia had put a hold on the appointment of the panel members and only lifted it in the last week of December 2023. On 1 February, the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee received a briefing from the new panel members appointed on 4 January, who presented their tentative work plan, which includes planned visits to the CAR and the region. They will only have less than six months to submit their final report in July, when the 2127 CAR sanctions regime is set for an extension. During the negotiations on MINUSCA’s mandate renewal in November 2023, China and Russia raised issues related to the 2127 CAR sanctions regime, alluding to the improved situation in the CAR and urging the Council to make adjustments accordingly. However, other Council members argued that this issue should be discussed in July.

Uncoordinated US withdrawal from Syria

By Ömer Özkizilcik

Reports have surfaced regarding the possibility of the United States withdrawing from Syria completely. Despite officials rejecting these reports and a recent vote in the US Senate exhibiting reluctance among lawmakers to leave Syria, news of a potential US exit has been closely monitored by regional actors. Turkey is among them. While Ankara may favor a future US withdrawal from Syria, it desires US coordination. An uncoordinated withdrawal by the United States could pose significant risks for Turkey, leaving the country alone against Iran and Russia.

Since 2014, when the Barack Obama administration searched for a local partner force in Syria to fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) without opposingIran, the relationship between Turkey and the United States has deteriorated. The US partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a designated foreign terrorist organization—was viewed by Ankara as a national security threat. However, in early October 2019, the situation got more complex when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and former President Donald Trump agreed on a partial US withdrawal. Trump later ordered a full withdrawal, but it was prevented at the last minute by a decision to secure oil in Syria. Shortly after, in October 2019, the Turks launched Operation Peace Spring and entered parts of northern Syria. However, Russia secured the majority of the territory from which the Americans withdrew, following a deal between the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus. The Russians effectively protected the SDF against Turkish attempts to launch new cross-border military operations.

If a complete US withdrawal from Syria is going to occur, Turkish decision-makers would prefer the United States to coordinate with Ankara. This option would allow different scenarios and roadmaps to facilitate US and Turkish interests in Syria and the broader region. For Turkey, a US withdrawal is not significant; the crucial question for Turkey is how the United States will withdraw.

In the event of an abrupt US withdrawal similar to what happened in Afghanistan, the Turkish government may face difficult decisions and encounter new threats from Syria. One of the most notable threats would come from Iran.

Iran is the best positioned to fill the void

The US forces in Syria rely on a single point of entry from Iraq for their logistical supply line. As a result, they will have to withdraw from the south to the north and retreat into Iraq gradually. Due to insufficient infrastructure, an airlift is not a viable option. In this scenario, Iran’s network across the Syria-Iraq border region around Abu Kamal in Deir ez-Zour makes it well-positioned to fill the void left by the United States. This would allow Iran to expand its only land supply route from Tehran to Beirut. Iranian militias on the western side of the Euphrates River would likely cross to the eastern side and enter former US zones of influence.

At the same time, Russian presence in SDF-controlled areas would enable the Russian military to move further eastward and control the entire Turkey-Syria border up to Iraq. The YPG-dominated SDF would probably negotiate with Damascus and trade its control over parts of Syria for official recognition and legitimization by the state. A potential agreement may be founded on shared hostility toward Turkey and the Syrian opposition. As a result, Iran would gain control over the oil-rich regions of Syria and expand its influence across the Syria-Iraq border. Conversely, the YPG would gain official status in Syria and ally itself with Russia, Iran, and the Bashar al-Assad regime, which could be troubling for Turkey.

To address the threat posed by the YPG in Syria, Turkey would need to secure the Kurdish-populated areas along its border. This decision would involve a military operation, and could potentially escalate tensions with Russia and Iran. This risky move could help Turkey limit the threat posed by the YPG, but could also be a premature birth of a battle in Syria.

The Turkish Achilles heel: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Regardless of Turkey’s actions in northeastern Syria, it will face significant pressure in the northwest. The Syrian conflict would then transform from a three-axis conflict into a two-axis conflict. In this new scenario, Tehran, Moscow, Damascus, and the YPG would probably aim to expel Turkey from Syria and enforce a military resolution to the conflict by dispossessing the Syrian opposition from their territory. Turkey and the Syrian opposition would then need to confront a new alliance of these four actors, which could tip the balance of power against them.

It has been reported that negotiations between Ankara and Damascus were not resolved due to the Assad regime’s insistence on a complete withdrawal of Turkish forces. On the other hand, Ankara argues that a withdrawal would have negative consequences for the political process and could lead to a mass migration of up to four million Syrians into Turkey. This scenario would be detrimental to Syria and result in significant domestic repercussions for Turkey.

In 2020, Turkey risked a confrontation with Russia and Iran after witnessing a similar situation. After thirty-four Turkish soldiers lost their lives in a single night, Ankara conducted a drone campaign that caused great destruction to the Syrian regime forces and Iran-backed Shia militias. Despite being alone in Idlib governorate, Turkey managed to successfully defend Idlib. However, this new scenario would have no US military presence in the east. Iran would have expanded its influence and secured a more stable logistical line from Iraq into Syria. Emboldened by the US withdrawal, Iran would likely be more aggressive.

Turkey’s primary vulnerability is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Idlib, where it faces mounting military pressure. The opposing alliance is likely to exploit the terrorist designation of HTS to launch a military operation in the name of counterterrorism. Such a step could lead to a new humanitarian disaster for more than three million people living in Idlib, as Iran and Russia are likely to exploit the HTS issue both militarily and diplomatically against Turkey.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is likely to reduce the amount of Russian investment available for a military escalation in Idlib, leaving Iran and its proxies to drive the attacks against Idlib. The Russian limitation presents an opportunity for Turkey to leverage its new domestically produced drones and air-defense systems, which were not present in 2020, to counter Iran.

In that case, Iran may seek to enhance its ties with the YPG, which the United States previously supported. This could result in a wider escalation of tensions across Syria. Similar to the current Iranian attacks against US bases in Syria and Iraq, Iran would use the PKK and its Syrian branch, the YPG, to attack Turkish forces in Syria and Iraq.

Ankara may initially perceive a potential US withdrawal from Syria as a positive development; however, the outcome could vary significantly based on how the US withdraws. Turkey would prefer a well-coordinated and orderly withdrawal process in close collaboration with its NATO ally. If the United States decides to withdraw from Syria without any coordination, it may lead to the handover of the US partner forces and the US zone of influence to Iran. In such a scenario, Iran would likely prioritize removing Turkey from Syria, as Ankara would be the only obstacle to Syria becoming a puppet state of Iran.

Global Polarity

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