Election-driven Global Shifts
Election-driven Global Shifts
A potential second Trump administration would likely be far different than his first,A sharp right turn 2024 European Parliament elections, BJP win almost an inevitability
UPDATES:A potential second Trump administration could bring significant changes in U.S. relations with Europe and NATO. While the first administration maintained consistent policies despite poor rhetoric, a second term might witness more alignment with Trump's views, faster appointment of loyalists, and attempts to weaken the civil service. Additionally, a Republican-controlled Congress could further support Trump's foreign policy agenda. Supporters are outlining clearer policy agendas, including reducing U.S. support for NATO. This could involve withdrawing funding or altering commitments.
The 2024 European Parliament elections will see a major shift to the right in many countries, with populist radical right parties gaining votes and seats across the EU.This ‘sharp right turn’ is likely to have significant consequences for European-level policies, which will affect the foreign policy choices that the EU can make, particularly on environmental issues, where the new majority is likely to oppose ambitious EU action to tackle climate change.
In India’s current political landscape, the consensus among political analysts is that a win for Modi and the BJP is the most plausible outcome.
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What to Expect from an Isolationist Administration or Trump 2.0
By Max Bergmann
A potential second Trump administration would likely be far different than his first. Europeans may look back on the first Trump administration and note that while the tone of relations were poor, the White House’s actual transatlantic policies were in fact very consistent with traditional U.S. approaches. Funding for European security initiatives, such as the European Deterrence Initiative, even increased under Trump. Looking ahead, Europeans may hope that a second Trump administration, like the first, may struggle to implement a new radical policy course toward Europe and NATO. After all, this will likely not be a new administration’s top priority and the people chosen to lead the Departments of State and Defense, as well as the national security advisor, might support largely maintaining the status quo. However, while it is possible a second Trump administration could resemble the first when it comes to Europe, it is also unlikely. There are several reasons for this.
First, a second Trump administration would likely have political appointees more closely aligned with the president and his outlook who would therefore be willing and eager to take policy direction from the White House. The first Trump administration struggled to staff his administration with people aligned with Trump’s own views, particularly for foreign policy roles. Appointees from the Washington policy community—such as Secretaries of Defense James Mattis and Mark Esper, National Security Advisor H. R. MacMaster, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson—often disagreed with President Trump, as was reflected throughout these national security agencies. Yet Trump’s supporters have undertaken new, expansive efforts to develop a deep roster of loyal political appointees willing to serve in a future administration. For instance, the conservative Heritage Foundation’s 2025 Presidential Transition Project (or “Project 2025”) aims to both develop policy ideas and vet personnel. The second Trump administration will likely move much faster in appointing ambassadors and other senior positions.
Second, a new Trump administration would likely seek to weaken the civil service. Many veterans of the Trump administration felt their efforts in government were often thwarted by career officials who inhibited efforts to change policy and failed to act on the president’s directions. President Trump issued an executive order at the end of his administration that would have allowed the president to turn any civil servant into a political appointee, thereby removing their employment protections and enabling them to be fired at will. This “Schedule F” provision was rescinded by President Biden, but the broader effort to radically reform the civil service was widely supported by the leading Republican primary candidates, including Governors DeSantis and Haley. Republicans have formulated several proposals to remove employment protections and enable the administration to fire career officials more easily if they are seen as failing to implement administration initiatives or resisting certain proposals. The threat of removal is a proposed mechanism to prompt career officials into compliance.
Third, Congress may be more supportive of Trump’s foreign policy agenda. An election victory for Trump could result in full Republican control of Congress. Currently, both the Senate and the House are almost evenly divided, with Democrats having a one-seat majority in the Senate and Republicans a very narrow majority in the House. The Senate map is seen as highly unfavorable for Democrats this election cycle. With Democrats expected to lose West Virginia, given Senator Joe Manchin’s retirement, they have an uphill climb to retain the 51 seats they would need to maintain Senate control with a Republican controlled White House (the vice president is the tie breaking vote in a 50–50 Senate). Democrats will need to not only hold on to seats in tough battleground states like Arizona, Montana, and Ohio, but also defeat an incumbent Republican senator, with Florida and Texas likely being their best shot. It is therefore difficult to see an election in which Democrats might hold the Senate by defeating an incumbent in a state like Florida while losing the presidency. It is more feasible that Democrats could take back control of the House while losing the presidency. Past presidential election cycles have shown a strong correlation that the party of the candidate who has the most votes gains seats in the House. It is possible Trump could win the presidency and lose the popular vote. For instance, Democrats gained six seats in 2016 and two seats in 2000 in the House, despite not claiming the White House. However, in 2020 Democrats lost 13 seats, despite Biden winning by more than 4 percent nationally. Thus, a Republican presidential victory is most likely to yield Republican control of both houses due to down-ballot voting. Yet although Republicans also controlled Congress during Trump’s first two years, they were not fully aligned with his foreign policy and his “America First” agenda. It was Congress that approved considerable funding for the European Deterrence Initiative and passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) over Trump’s objections. However, Republicans in Congress have become more isolationist, as shown by the fight over whether to aid Ukraine. If Trump wins the election, he will likely further bolster the shift within the party away from the hawkish internationalism, resulting in stronger congressional support for his foreign policy agenda. Congress is therefore unlikely to be able to pass legislation to counter administration efforts, even if Democrats are able to retake control of the House of Representatives.
Fourth, ahead of elections, self-described supporters of President Trump are forming a clearer and more concrete policy agenda for a new administration than in 2016, which includes reducing U.S. support for NATO. When it comes to Europe, there are growing calls for the United States to reduce its support for European security. There has been much attention on the question of whether President Trump will pull the United States out of NATO. This prompted Congress to include a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to require a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate to approve a formal U.S. withdrawal from NATO. However, a new administration does not have to formally pull out of NATO to dramatically change the nature of the United States’ commitment to NATO. For instance, should President Trump declare that the United States would not uphold its Article 5 commitment to come to the aid of a NATO member country should it come under attack, there is little Congress can do. One prominent paper by Sumantra Maitra at the Center for Renewing America has called for a “dormant NATO.” In this approach, the United States would pull back from funding the organization, essentially putting “NATO on ice, only to be activated in times of crisis.” This model also “coerces Europe by fixing a timeframe after which the armor, logistics, artillery, intel, and infantry pass on to European hands” while leaving the U.S. nuclear umbrella in place. Similarly, Christopher Miller, writing for the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, advocates “transform[ing] NATO so that U.S. allies are capable of fielding the great majority of the conventional forces required to deter Russia while relying on the United States primarily for our nuclear deterrent, and select other capabilities while reducing the U.S. force posture in Europe.”
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EU election forecast and its implication
By European Council on Foreign Relation
The 2024 European Parliament elections will see a major shift to the right in many countries, with populist radical right parties gaining votes and seats across the EU, and centre-left and green parties losing votes and seats. Inside the European Parliament, a populist right coalition of Christian democrats, conservatives, and radical right MEPs could emerge with a majority for the first time.
Policy implications
The changes to the political groups and coalitions will have consequences for the EU’s policy agenda and the direction of future EU legislation. Coalitions on policy issues in the European Parliament tend not to be the result of formal agreements. Instead, political groups decide how to vote issue by issue. Nevertheless, we can use the voting patterns and winning coalition sizes in the current parliament to predict how far EU policies might change with the predicted group sizes and balance of power after the 2024 elections.
Based on the analysis of recorded (roll-call) votes in the European Parliament collected by VoteWatch, different coalitions have tended to dominate in different policy areas in 2019-2024:
A centrist grand coalition (EPP + S&D, usually also with RE) typically won on budgets, budgetary control, culture and education, economic and monetary affairs, foreign affairs, internal market and consumer protection, legal affairs, and transport and tourism.
A centre + left coalition (S&D + RE+ G/EFA + the Left) usually won on civil liberties and justice and home affairs, development, employment and social affairs, environment, and women’s rights and gender equality.
A centre + right coalition (EPP + RE + ECR, and sometimes ID) usually won on agriculture and rural development, fisheries, industry and research, and international trade.
Our research suggests that in most of these policy areas, these coalitions and winning patterns are likely to continue, at least at the start of the next parliamentary term. For example, on foreign affairs, such as EU support for Ukraine, the majority in the next European Parliament is likely to back a continuation of the type of financial, logistical, and military aid that Western states have been approving for Kyiv since February 2022. However, there will be a larger number of MEPs (particularly in ID and among the non-attached MEPs) who are more sympathetic towards Russia. Furthermore, support for Ukraine in the rest of the parliament might also soften as national parties start to respond to the changing opinions of their voters, expressed by their votes in the European Parliament elections.
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BJP win in India’s 2024 general election ‘almost an inevitability’
By The Guardian
India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, has cut a confident figure in recent weeks. As his Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) swept three major state elections in December, Modi did not hold back from predicting that “this hat-trick has guaranteed the 2024 victory”.
It was a sign that with less than six months to go before the general election, in which Modi will be seeking a third term in power, campaign season has begun with gusto.
In India’s current political landscape, the consensus among political analysts is that a win for Modi and the BJP is the most plausible outcome.
The prime minister’s popularity as a political strongman, alongside the BJP’s Hindu nationalist agenda, continues to appeal to the large Hindu majority of the country, particularly in the populous Hindi belt of the north, resulting in the widespread persecution of Muslims.
At state and national level, the apparatus of the country has been skewed heavily towards the BJP since Modi was elected in 2014. He has been accused of overseeing an unprecedented consolidation of power, muzzling critical media, eroding the independence of the judiciary and all forms of parliamentary scrutiny and accountability and using government agencies to pursue and jail political opponents.
While regional opposition to the BJP is strong in pockets of south and east India, nationally it is seen as fragmented and weak. The main opposition Indian National Congress party won the state election in Telangana this month but is in power in only three states overall and is perceived as hierarchical and riddled with infighting.
The recently formed coalition of all major opposition parties – which goes by the acronym INDIA – has yet to unite on crucial issues, though it has vowed to fight the BJP collectively.
“The general sense is that a BJP win is almost an inevitability at this stage,” said Neelanjan Sircar, a fellow at the Centre for Policy research. “The question is more: what factors will shape the scale of the victory?”
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