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Dec 16, 2023

UPDATE: How does Australia operate in the world? And why? In this closely evidenced, original account, former Australian Army intelligence analyst Clinton Fernandes categorically debunks Australia’s greatest myth: that of its own independence.

Jake Sullivan noted that the Biden administration is “often asked about the end state of U.S. competition with China.” He argued that “we do not expect a transformative end state like the one that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union.” Instead, the Biden administration has identified three lines of effort in U.S. relations with China: investing, aligning, and competing.

“The Decline of the TV Industry.” Shari Redstone to sell her stake in CBS and second, Nelson Peltz stepped up his pressure on election to Disney’s board. At the heart of both dramas is shareholder dissatisfaction with the sorry state of the TV industry.

It is a sight to behold when a long-nosed javelin in white and gold zips through a desert at 300 km/h. The 450kmh electric railway, Haramain Express (which means two sanctuaries in Arabic), is designed to carry 60 million passengers a year, including millions of Hajj and Umrah pilgrims, through its 35 trains.

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Does America Have an End Game on China?

Washington Wants Change, But It Can Come in Stages

Stage I

This fall, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted that the Biden administration is “often asked about the end state of U.S. competition with China.” He argued that “we do not expect a transformative end state like the one that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union.” Instead, the Biden administration has identified three lines of effort in U.S. relations with China: investing, aligning, and competing.

Investing comprises domestic initiatives in the United States while aligning involves cooperation with allies and partners. Thus, the only portion of the Biden administration’s China strategy that explicitly centers on China is competition. Yet, competition does not amount to an objective in itself, but rather a description of current circumstances. As White House Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell has warned, “competition is not itself a strategy.” Indeed, before taking office, Campbell and Sullivan argued that an approach centered on strategic competition “reflects uncertainty about what that competition is over and what it means to win.” So the question remains: What is America’s vision of success?

The Allure of Steady States

In introducing his 2022 National Security Strategy, President Joe Biden promisedto “win the competition for the 21st century.” But what winning means remains unclear. Indeed, senior officials within the Biden administration reject the notion that the United States should aim for a specific “end state”—which usually describes a situation following the completion of an objective—when it comes to China. Instead, Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan have advocated that the United States “seek to achieve not a definitive end state akin to the Cold War’s ultimate conclusion but a steady state of clear-eyed coexistence on terms favorable to U.S. interests and values.” They reject end states in favor of “accepting competition as a condition to be managed rather than a problem to be solved.”

There are three strong arguments against identifying an end state for U.S. strategy on China. First, “solving” the “China challenge” is a misnomer since even a change of governance in Beijing would bring about new challenges. If the Chinese people choose to make fundamental changes to their country’s political structures tomorrow, tensions over Taiwan and U.S. regional presence would no doubt remain. Political science research even suggests that a democratizing China could worsen tensions with the United States. As a result, some experts have endorsed the Biden administration’s focus on steady states, with Center for a New American Security CEO Richard Fontaine affirming that Washington “should manage global problems, not try to solve them.”

Second, bureaucratic disagreements could stymie efforts to select an ideal end state. Although there is growing concern about China in Washington, there remains little consensus on the strategy that U.S. policymakers should adopt. A debate about end states might therefore prove divisive since no single end state is likely to appeal to all stakeholders. Even within the Biden administration, it could be difficult to get democracy and human rights advocates on the same page with environmentalists and economists. Getting Congress on board would be another matter altogether. As a result, it might not be possible bureaucratically to agree on an end state.

Third, even if U.S. leaders could agree on what they ultimately want, doing so might alienate allies and partners. For example, if the United States sought to accelerate the collapse of the Communist Party, few if any U.S. allies and partners would be comfortable with that objective. Conversely, returning to a “new type of great power relations” would leave many worried about a great power condominium. Forcing a discussion on end states might thus weaken rather than strengthen the very coalitions that the United States needs to address the challenges that China poses.

The Necessity of End States

It is entirely reasonable, therefore, that Kurt Campbell has urged turning “the focus from end states to steady states.” Indeed, many in Washington agree that it might be wiser to sidestep the end states discussion, at least for the time being. The question is whether this approach is sustainable. Can policymakers build a lasting China strategy without an end goal in mind? Will the American people and friends abroad support a strategy predicated on an ongoing competition with no ultimate objective? In short, is managed competition a description of the current situation, or is it an actual strategy?

Advocates of identifying an end state counter their critics with three arguments of their own. First, without a clear objective, it is difficult to assess the success or failure of America’s current strategy. The Biden team sometimes says it is aiming for managed competition with China. But this simply implies competition without conflict, which already exists today. Strategy usually requires identifying an objective and then marshaling resources and plans to accomplish that goal. If the objective is simply maintaining the status quo of competition without conflict, then so long as deterrence holds, the administration’s strategy is working. This makes it nearly impossible to assess or measure progress, since the objective is already being accomplished.

Second, without a clear aim it is difficult to explain how the United States should make difficult strategic choices on everything from economic de-risking to deterrence posture to diplomatic engagement. Building political support for costly policies within the United States and among allies and partners requires a clear logic, which demands more than a hazy concept of competition. The vagueness of managed competition can justify almost any policy, from tough export controls and investment restrictions to deep dialogue with Beijing. Identifying an ultimate objective would help policymakers determine how to assess trade-offs strategically.

Third, the Biden team has been effective at describing what it does not want with China, but ineffective at describing what it does want. For example, Chinese media asserts that U.S. leaders committed privately to “four no’s and one no-intention” during last year’s Xi-Biden meeting in Bali, Indonesia. Regardless of the veracity of these claims, senior U.S. leaders have made a wide variety of statements asserting that they:

These statements lay out what Washington does not want, without presenting a positive vision. This is one reason that Chinese observers are so skeptical of American assurances—many seem to be substanceless platitudes at odds with American actions. Although the National Security Strategy and Indo-Pacific Strategy articulate some positive goals such as “strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and accountable democratic governance,” these documents say surprisingly little about U.S. objectives vis-à-vis China. This leaves many American citizens, members of Congress, and foreign policymakers unsure about whether Washington actually has a vision for what managed competition entails. For all these reasons, it would be beneficial for the United States to identify an ultimate objective of its China policy.

Australia in the International Arena

by Clinton Fernandes

How does Australia operate in the world? And why? In this closely evidenced, original account, former Australian Army intelligence analyst Clinton Fernandes categorically debunks Australia’s greatest myth: that of its own independence.

'This book is a bold and challenging interpretation of not only Australian Foreign Policy, but of the psyche of the nation itself. Fernandes gives us a fast-paced, thought-provoking interpretation which many readers may not like. This is what happens when someone shakes the foundations. But that’s the point. Fernandes's analysis will have forced you to ask and answer some profound questions about this nation’s place in the world, and the course its leaders chose to chart. Do not let the author’s brevity deceive you for this work is also an iceberg-you are reading the tip of a mountain of scholarship, knowledge and analysis that lies out of view.

I wholeheartedly recommend this work to any and all with even a passing interest in foreign policy, the dynamics of power and the nature of contemporary Australia. Once you start you will not put it down, and along the way you might just have uncovered a new lens through which to see the world about you.' Professor Craig Stockings, Official Historian of Australian Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Australian Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor

Listen to full review here.

Why Nelson Peltz Can’t Fix Disney

by Martin Peers

Judging by two news events this week, next year will be dominated by new episodes in that long-running series, “The Decline of the TV Industry.” First, widespread reports that Shari Redstone is in talks to sell her stake in CBS owner Paramount Global suggest the Redstone family is finally throwing in the towel. Or at least they’re trying to, if they can find someone to catch it. And second, Nelson Peltz stepped up his pressure on Disney by nominating himself and former Disney Chief Financial Officer Jay Rasulo (the latter playing the role of Brutus to Disney CEO Bob Iger’s Caesar) for election to Disney’s board. At the heart of both dramas is shareholder dissatisfaction with the sorry state of the TV industry. Shareholder activism can’t solve that problem, and selling only kicks the issue to someone else.

The core issue is that we’re transitioning from the cable TV business model, which was skewed to making unreasonable profits at the expense of viewers, to a streaming one that gives consumers more control. Even as streaming services introduce ads and ratchet up prices to cut their losses, we can still easily chop and change streamers we’re paying for, which isn’t true with cable. (I recently discovered I was paying, via Amazon Channels, for five services I’d stopped watching. It took a minute to cancel four of them.) And, given the competition from Netflix, Amazon and Apple, this consumer-friendly approach is likely to persist. What that means is the TV industry’s fat profit margins of years past are not coming back.

China ‘Flies’ Its Bullet Train In Arabian Deserts

Beijing ‘Replaces’ US As Saudi Arabia’s Strongest Ally

by Manoj Menon

Built by China Railway 18th Bureau Group, Chinese firms are at the forefront of railway construction in the broader Middle East region as many countries boost their spending on creating new or upgrading existing rail infrastructure.

Using electric propulsion that will drive the trains to an operating speed of 300 kilometers per hour, the express train is expected to cut travel time between Mecca and Madinah to under two hours instead of six hours by bus.

The train is the largest transportation project in the Middle East and one of the world’s most significant public transportation projects.

Haramain Express is the first double-track electrified high-speed railway in Saudi Arabia and the world’s first desert high-speed railway to have Chinese companies involved in its construction. The high-speed railway has brought a new experience of traveling on land in Saudi Arabia.

The rail, the first railway built by a Chinese company in the Middle East, is aimed at easing traffic congestion on the road during the Hajj and providing a convenient transportation option for pilgrims as it links three main Hajj destinations.

The trains, among the world’s top 10 fastest, are just the beginning of a rail network expected to expand across the Middle Eastern Kingdom as it invests billions in infrastructure to boost tourism and diversify revenues beyond oil.

Besides the Haramain Express project, China is also involved in Saudi Arabia’s signature $500 billion mega-city project, NEOM. China and Saudi Arabia recently set up a $20 billion investment fund to link Saudi Vision 2030 with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

There has also been speculation that China will buy the shares in Saudi Aramco in a private deal. Such a transaction would represent a political signal by Xi Jinping in support of Mohammed bin Salman. It could also signal a pivotal Saudi realignment away from the US and towards China.

As Wu Sike, former Chinese Special envoy to the Middle East, puts it, “The cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia is based on consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits. The cooperation pattern we share is 1+2+3. One means energy cooperation will be the principal axis. Two means of infrastructure construction under the wings of trade and investment facilitation. Three stands for cooperation in high and new technology, new energy, and space.”

The deft diplomacy by Beijing comes against the backdrop of Washington retreating from the region as part of its foreign policy since the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

According to business intelligence firm MEED, rail contracts worth $16 billion are set to be awarded in the Middle East and North Africa this year. The longer-term pipeline projects could reach well above $200 billion. No wonder Chinese firms are hoping to cash in on the prospects.

Experts have described China’s foray into the construction of railways across the region as ‘Railway Diplomacy‘ and is at the heart of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to connect Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

America’s Loss Is China’s Gain

According to reports, the Saudi government in the past indicated that US assistance in building nuclear power plants was a precondition for Riyadh concerning any US plans to normalize its relations with Israel.

However, such a thing now appears to be off the cards, as the Kingdom will get from China the necessary technical expertise and equipment required for the plants. The Saudis can now refuse to recognize Israel without facing any repercussions.

During the past decade, mainly motivated by the Belt and Road Initiative, new cooperation mechanisms have been established by China and Arab states. At the bilateral level, China established comprehensive strategic partnerships with Algeria and Egypt in 2014, Saudi Arabia in 2016, and UAE in 2016. China established strategic partnerships with Qatar in 2014, Iraq in 2015, Morocco in 2016, and Oman and Kuwait in 2018.

As of January 2022, 20 Arab states had signed cooperative agreements with China under the Belt and Road Initiative in various fields covering energy, investment, trade, finance, infrastructure, and high-tech.

At the multilateral level, China and Arab states established the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in 2004 and the China-Arab States Expo in 2013. In 2018, the Declaration of Action on China-Arab States Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative was signed by China and Arab states at the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, which directed the cooperation between China and Arab states. Recently, Saudi Arabia has been included in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a “dialogue partner.”

Riyadh’s move to partner with the bloc also came less than three weeks after unveiling a landmark China-brokered reconciliation deal with Iran to restore full diplomatic relations that were severed seven years ago.

Long bitter rivals, Shia-majority Iran and mainly Sunni Saudi Arabia, have engaged in a series of proxy conflicts in the region, such as Yemen. Tehran has denied backing the Houthis rebels, who took control of vast swathes of the impoverished country in late 2014, pushing out the internationally recognized government of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi.

The Saudi-led military alliance intervened in support of Hadi in March 2015, but the Houthis remain in control of the country, including the capital Sanaa.

Riyadh has said that while it had engaged in previous rounds of bilateral talks with Tehran, the reconciliation process was jump-started by President Xi Jinping’s offer last year to serve as a “bridge” between the two Middle East heavyweights.

Xi’s role in the rapprochement raised eyebrows given Saudi Arabia’s traditionally close partnership with Washington, though that relationship has been under strain recently because of disputes over human rights and oil production.

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