Diplomate et Diplomatie
Diplomate et Diplomatie
Le marquis de Custine, Poutine et la Russie éternelle, Cooperation between the UN, CSTO, CIS, and SCO, Fighting for the independence of France's overseas territories.
Le marquis de Custine, Poutine et la Russie éternelle
By Guillaume Lagane (The Conversation France)
On le sait depuis le succès de ses Lettres de Russie en 1839, Custine est la lecture obligée de tout bon observateur du pouvoir russe et de sa diplomatie. Légitimiste parti étudier les vertus du régime absolutiste de Nicolas Ier, le marquis de Custine en revient convaincu par la supériorité de la monarchie limitée de Louis-Philippe. S’il a un style admirable, que l’on a comparé à Tocqueville, Custine n’en a pas la profondeur. Bien des parties de son ouvrage, dont on ne lit aujourd’hui que des extraits, ont vieilli.
Mais pour reprendre le mot fameux de George Kennan, « si ce n’est pas un très bon livre sur la Russie en 1839, c’est à coup sûr un livre excellent, sans doute le meilleur de tous, sur la Russie de Staline et un livre encore pas mauvais du tout sur celle de Brejnev et de Kossyguine ». Alors que dire de la Russie de Poutine ! Force est en effet de constater l’aspect souvent troublant des digressions de Custine. Le despotisme russe du premier XIXe siècle, avec le règne d’un tsar qui a commencé par la répression sévère d’une insurrection libérale, celle des décabristes en 1825, ressemble étrangement au pouvoir russe actuel.
Des parallèles frappants avec l’actualité presque deux cents ans plus tard
Fouillé par des douaniers soupçonneux, surveillé dans toutes ses visites, Custine étouffe dans cette « oppression déguisée en amour de l’ordre ». L’aubergiste de Lübeck l’avait prévenu contre un pays « que l’on quitte avec tant de joie et où l’on retourne avec tant de regret ». Bien sûr, Custine est injuste : il n’aime pas le paysage russe, trouve fade l’architecture néo-classique, et, catholique convaincu, réserve des flèches acérées à l’Église orthodoxe. Mais il diagnostique avec précision le principe actif du régime russe : l’absence de liberté y façonne toute l’organisation sociale et jusqu’à la psychologie des individus.
La Russie est une société où « nul bonheur n’est possible parce qu’il y manque la liberté ». Custine fustige le goût généralisé du mensonge : « le régime ne résisterait pas à vingt ans de libre communication avec l’Occident », « qu’on accorde pendant vingt-quatre heures la liberté de presse à la Russie, ce que vous apprendrez vous fera reculer d’horreur ». Il moque ces « physionomies prudentes dont l’expression peu franche fait trouver vide la société elle-même », un « pays où tout homme en naissant fait l’apprentissage de la discrétion ».
Mais Custine décrit une relation avec la Russie qui, de manière troublante, semble souvent correspondre à la réalité d’aujourd’hui. Ainsi de l’impérialisme d’un État qui « ne peut vivre que de conquêtes » et d’une nation russe qui « expie d’avance chez elle, par une soumission avilissante, l’espoir d’exercer la tyrannie chez les autres ». À l’époque, le sujet est la Pologne, pays catholique et monarchie constitutionnelle dont l’insurrection en 1830 a été sévèrement châtiée, mais on voit bien le parallèle avec l’Ukraine.
Ainsi du rapport à la vérité, avec ces lignes étonnantes quand on les relit actuellement, à l’heure de la guerre hybride menée contre les sociétés occidentales :
« S’il se trouve parmi les Russes de meilleurs diplomates que chez les peuples les plus avancés en civilisation, c’est que nos journaux les avertissent de tout ce qui se passe et se projette chez nous, et qu’au lieu de leur déguiser nos faiblesses avec prudence, nous les leur révélons avec passion tous les matins […] Nous marchons au grand jour, ils avancent à couvert : la partie n’est pas égale. »
Au sujet d’un naufrage lors duquel de nombreux Russes ont trouvé la mort mais dont les journaux ont eu ordre de ne pas parler, Custine s’étonne du silence de la population et du contraste avec la France de 1839 : dans notre pays, « que de journaux diraient, et que de voix répéteraient, que la police ne fait jamais son devoir, que les bateaux sont mauvais, les bateliers avides, et que l’autorité, loin de remédier au danger, l’aggrave, soit par son insouciance, soit par sa cupidité… et alors les dates, les allusions, les citations abonderaient… Ici, rien ! »
Invariants culturels ou politiques ?
Il reste que la Russie a bien changé depuis le règne de Nicolas Ier. À l’époque déjà de son voyage, Custine n’a pas vu certains changements en cours comme l’industrialisation du pays, la naissance d’une classe moyenne, les progrès économiques et sociaux qui allaient aboutir, bien plus tard, à l’abolition du servage en 1861. Il a sans doute aussi été influencé par les contempteurs du pouvoir russe qu’étaient les milieux libéraux en exil. Si la Russie de 1839 était un peu différente de celle qu’a vue Custine, elle devrait d’autant plus n’avoir aucun rapport avec celle que nous connaissons en 2024 – urbaine, vieillissante, développée, transformée par deux guerres mondiales et soixante-dix ans de soviétisme… Et pourtant, le parallèle entre la société observée par Custine et celle de Poutine ne cesse de surprendre.
Faut-il incriminer un invariant culturel qui tiendrait à la nation russe elle-même ? C’est ce que suggère Custine : « Ce n’est pas d’aujourd’hui que les étrangers s’étonnent de l’amour de ce peuple pour son esclavage. » Dans cette vision des relations internationales, chère à Samuel Huntington, la politique étrangère de Moscou serait un reflet de sa civilisation, étroitement liée à la société russe elle-même, et dont le pouvoir poutinien serait l’expression.
Ce parallélisme alimente d’ailleurs le discours de tous ceux qui, des Putinverstehersallemands jusqu’aux divers courants pro-russes français, considèrent que l’on ne peut changer la Russie, qu’elle possède d’immuables « intérêts de sécurité », une conception du monde qui lui est propre et qu’il faut donc la prendre telle qu’elle est, chercher à la rassurer faute de la changer. Poutine peut disparaître, Moscou demeurera, avec sa géographie, son peuple, ses mœurs. Custine sera le meilleur des introducteurs à la Russie de 2039.
Une autre manière d’expliquer Custine est de se référer aux théories libérales des relations internationales. La diplomatie d’un État est celle de son régime politique : si la politique étrangère de la Russie n’a pas changé, c’est que son régime demeure autoritaire ou, pour reprendre les mots de Custine, despotique. Dans cette vision, l’impérialisme est le stade suprême de la tyrannie. Cette explication peut d’ailleurs renforcer l’hypothèse culturaliste, la Russie n’ayant connu que de brèves et incomplètes expériences démocratiques, comme la création de la Douma en 1905, le gouvernement provisoire de février 1917 et la décennie 1990.
Questions pour aujourd’hui
Quelles que soient les explications à donner à l’étrange prémonition du marquis de Custine, sa lecture n’incite pas à l’optimisme sur le conflit ukrainien et l’avenir des relations de la Russie et de l’Occident. Rejetant la liberté, choisissant la force, dénigrant la vérité, la politique étrangère de Moscou est, en 1839 comme aujourd’hui, en profond décalage avec la société européenne. Faut-il en conclure que seul un changement du régime russe modifiera sa diplomatie ? C’est ce que la lecture de Custine suggère, même si la tâche paraît aussi titanesque qu’incertaine.
Faut-il, au contraire, accepter de revenir sur notre goût pour la paix et la plus complète liberté face à un impérialisme décomplexé et une société russe qui ne changera pas ? Ce sont des transformations de fond dont on voit, avant même de les entreprendre, tous les risques et toutes les difficultés. Mais Custine, se souvenant de l’occupation de Paris en 1814, anticipant semble-t-il l’expansionnisme soviétique et peut-être les menées russes de demain, nous avait prévenus :
« Si nous étions destinés à souffrir l’ignominie d’une nouvelle invasion, le triomphe des vainqueurs ne m’attesterait que les fautes des vaincus. »
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Cooperation between the UN, CSTO, CIS, and SCO
Source: UN Security Council
On 19 July, 2024, the Security Council held a debate on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations, focusing on the role of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in maintaining international peace and security. Russia, a founding member of these three organisations, convened the debate as a signature event of its July Council presidency, and its Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin chaired the meeting. CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov, CIS Secretary General Sergey Lebedev, and SCO Secretary General Zhang Ming were expected to brief.
Strengthening cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations—as envisioned in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter—has become an increasingly prominent theme for the Security Council. The AU, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are some of the organisations that have developed more institutionalised relationships with the Council.
In recent years, Russia has sought to promote greater cooperation between the UN and regional organisations operating in the Eurasian region. Tomorrow’s debate will be the fourth meeting organised by Russia on this topic. During its October 2016 presidency of the Council, Russia organised the first Council meeting on cooperation between the UN and the CSTO, the SCO, and the CIS. In September 2019, Russia initiated a ministerial-level debate on the role of these organisations in countering terrorist threats. Most recently, on 16 February 2022, Russia convened a debate focusing on cooperation between the UN and the CSTO. Tomorrow’s debate will be the first meeting on this topic since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
According to a concept note (S/2024/538) circulated by Russia ahead of tomorrow’s meeting, the objective of the debate is to offer an opportunity for member states to “share their vision for enhancing security in Eurasia through existing regional mechanisms”. Delegations participating in the debate are encouraged to offer insights in this regard, including on the nexus between security and development.
The concept note describes the roles of the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO, and outlines the framework governing cooperation between these organisations and the UN. It highlights that cooperation has progressed across several different tracks, including counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, and combatting organised crime. The concept note poses several questions to help guide the discussion at tomorrow’s meeting:
How can regional organisations contribute to further strengthening the UN and promoting its goals?
How can the potential of regional organisations such as the CSTO, the SCO, and the CIS to complement the UN’s efforts in maintaining peace and security be enhanced?
What new areas of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations may appear in the future?
Council members are generally supportive of efforts to enhance cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations. There are, however, apparent divisions among Council members in their positions about the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO. Some members—including the P3 (France, the UK, and the US)—have been critical of these organisations, viewing them as a vehicle for some of their most dominant members to enhance their influence in the region. On the other hand, Russia has argued that certain Council members have sought to downplay the role of these organisations.
These divisions have been evident during Council discussions on the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA). Until early 2015, Council members routinely issued a press statement after each biannual briefing on UNRCCA, encouraging increased cooperation and coordination among the Central Asian countries, UNRCCA, and “relevant regional organisations”. In recent years, however, Russia (the penholder on UNRCCA) proposed including specific references to the CSTO, the SCO, and the CIS alongside the OSCE and the EU. The P3 members have opposed these additions, and a press statement on the UNRCCA has not been issued since January 2018.
Divisions among member states regarding cooperation between the UN and the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO have become more pronounced following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As a result, discussions in the General Assembly on this topic, previously non-controversial, have become increasingly contentious. An illustrative example occurred on 21 November 2022, when the General Assembly voted on separate draft resolutions on cooperation between the UN and various regional organisations. Typically adopted by consensus without a vote, a recorded vote was requested for resolution A/RES/77/13 on cooperation between the UN and the CSTO. Prior to the vote, Russia expressed regret over a letter from Ukraine indicating its intention to vote against the draft resolution, and described it as an attempt to project the “difficult bilateral relations onto a regional organization that is in no way involved” in the conflict. Russia further warned that putting a technical draft to a vote could open the door for reconsideration of “any agreed language in similar resolutions”.
Russia also criticised what it described as attempts to politicise resolutions on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, citing resolution A/RES/77/19 of 21 November 2022 on cooperation between the UN and the Central European Initiative (CEI). This resolution included both preambular and operative paragraphs referencing the CEI’s efforts to alleviate the “serious consequences caused by the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine”. Notably, a request was made to conduct a vote on both paragraphs.
Several delegations—including Council members France, Guyana, Japan, Malta, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, Switzerland, the UK, and the US—abstained from voting on resolution A/RES/77/13, saying that they are unable to support a resolution endorsing UN-CSTO cooperation in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Pointing out that the Russian armed forces constitute a core component of the CSTO, some member states argued that the war in Ukraine has hampered the CSTO’s credibility and presented a substantial barrier to effective cooperation with the UN.
The work of the UNRCCA is a likely topic of discussion tomorrow. The cooperation between the regional centre and the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO is highlighted in the concept note as a “positive example” of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. The role in Afghanistan of regional organisations might also be discussed. The concept note says that the CSTO, through its working group on Afghanistan, is actively contributing to efforts aimed at countering threats emanating from the country.
The debate will also provide an opportunity for Council members to discuss cooperation between the UN and regional organisations more broadly. In this regard, some Council members are expected to highlight initiatives throughout the region by other regional organisations, such as the EU, the OSCE, and the C5+1 diplomatic platform, which is a summit held annually since 2015 among the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, together with the US Secretary of State.
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Congress of Independence Movements
Fighting for the independence of France's overseas territories
By Fatima Latifova (Azernews)
On July 17, the first Congress is being held in Baku, organized by the People's Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe and supported by the Baku Initiative Group, with the participation of leaders from more than 15 political parties and independence movements from Corsica, Melanesia, Polynesia, the Caribbean, and the Antilles, who suffer from French colonialism, Azernews reports.
The idea of holding the Congress belongs to political parties and movements fighting for the independence of France's overseas territories.
Three organizations from the Dutch colonies of Bonaire and Saint Martin are participating as honorary guests in the Congress.
The two-day Congress will provide participating parties with the opportunity to discuss ways to achieve tighter organization in their struggle for independence, as well as to coordinate result-oriented activities to overcome French colonialism by creating a unified platform. Representatives of the colonies will also discuss the most effective experiences and strategies in their struggle for self-determination.
The Congress will contribute to raising international awareness about the numerous crimes and illegal actions committed by the French government against the indigenous peoples of these territories and will draw attention to the problem of colonialism, which remains one of the scourges of the 21st century.
It should be noted that the Baku Initiative Group was created on July 6, 2023, in Baku during the ministerial meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, chaired by the Republic of Azerbaijan, under the theme "Towards the Complete Eradication of Colonialism." For a year now, the Group has been supporting the just struggle for freedom of peoples suffering from colonialism. In this regard, the BTG has already organized about 15 international conferences. Four of them were held at the UN headquarters in New York, Geneva, and Vienna, one in Istanbul, and the others in Baku.
Sometime ago a ‘Baku initiative group against French colonialism’ was established.
This decision was made following the event "Towards the complete elimination of colonialism", organized in Baku by the Centre for Analysis of International Relations within the framework of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, Azernews reports.
During the meeting, participants discussed ways to eliminate the current colonial policy of France on the African continent and in various regions of the world and exchanged views on the adoption of necessary measures to eradicate this problem.
A statement on the outcome of the event underlined the validity and relevance of the principal position of the Non-Aligned Movement in combating colonial and neo-colonial practices.
The Baku Initiative Group against French colonialism was established at the event “Towards the Complete Elimination of Colonialism,” held in Baku, Azerbaijan. The event was organized by the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and provided a platform for exchanging views on ways to eliminate the neo-colonial policy of France.
The French colonial empire, which began in the 16th century, reached its apex between the two world wars and was the second-largest colonial empire in the world behind the British Empire. France had colonies in North America, the Caribbean, India, Africa, Indochina, and the South Pacific. Its goal was to spread the French language and Catholicism, and to promote the “Civilising Mission”.
The French colonial project was met with resistance from the colonised people, who sought to reclaim their autonomy and freedom. In Burkina Faso, formerly known as the Republic of Upper Volta, the Mossi people established powerful kingdoms in the 11th and 13th centuries. In 1896, the country was colonised by the French, and in 1958, it became a self-governing colony within the French Community. In 1960, it gained full independence with Maurice Yaméogo as president.
The Baku Initiative Group against French colonialism was established to take the necessary steps to eradicate de facto slavery on the African continent and in various regions of the world. The statement adopted at the event calls for the complete elimination of colonialism and the promotion of autonomy and freedom for all colonised people.
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