Cambodia's New Confidence
Cambodia's New Confidence
Deep Dive into the geopolitics of South East Asia and a focus on Cambodian Renaissance.
Deep Dive into the geopolitics of South East Asia and a focus on Cambodian Renaissance.
Machine generated transcript
Since ‘year zero Cambodia's economy has grown just so far and is now officially a ‘lower middle income’ (LMI) . Basically since about 2012 it has had phenomenal growth phenomenal and that's before there was huge influx of capital from China. The Cambodian economy had already started to take off, because they had political stability.
Hello everybody this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies and today I'm talking to Dr Digby James Wren a colleague from the Multipolar Peace Alliance. Dr Wren holds a PhD in international relations from Australia's Deakin University. He is a leading sinologist and Asian geopolitical expert. Dr. Wren holds the chair of Belt and Road Capital Partners a geopolitical risk advisory firm and, among many other roles, he's also the external relations advisor to the president of the Royal Academy of Cambodia and Dean of its media and policy labs and also several other things we'll talk about that in addition Dr. Wren is running the very successful and highly informative Long Mekong Substack and TheChair_Live on which he regularly publishes highly insightful articles about politics in Southeast Asia and especially about Cambodia.
I recommend checking it out and we'll talk about all of that just now:
Aukus pact will turn Australia into ‘51st state’ of the US, Paul Keating says
Former prime minister argues Australia has made itself a target by aligning with American ‘aggression’ towards China
Martin Farrer and Daniel Hurst
Australia’s participation in the Aukus defence pact risks handing military control of the country to Washington and becoming the “51st state of the United States”, according to former prime minister Paul Keating.
Speaking on ABC’s 7.30 on Thursday night, Keating argued that Australia had made itself a target for aggression by joining the military alliance with the US and the UK in implicit opposition to China’s growing power in the Asia Pacific region.
Australia had no quarrel with China, Keating said, and concerns about China’s designs on Taiwan were not justified because the island was “Chinese real estate”.
“Taiwan is not a vital Australian interest,” he said, adding that the American attitude to Taiwan was like China deciding that Tasmania needed help to secede from Australia.
“What Aukus is about in the American mind is turning [Australia into suckers], locking us up for 40 years with American bases all around … not Australian bases,” he said.
“So Aukus is really about, in American terms, the military control of Australia. I mean, what’s happened … is likely to turn Australia into the 51st state of the United States.”
Keating told the show’s presenter, Sarah Ferguson: “We’re now defending the fact that we’re in Aukus.
“If we weren’t in Aukus, we wouldn’t need to defend it. If we didn’t have an aggressive ally like the United States – aggressive to others in the region – there’d be nobody attacking Australia. We are better left alone than we are being ‘protected’ by an aggressive power like the United States.
“Australia is capable of defending itself.
“There’s no way another state can invade a country like Australia with an armada of ships without it all failing. I mean, Australia is quite capable of defending itself. We don’t need to be basically a pair of shoes hanging out of the Americans’ backside.”
Keating, a longstanding opponent of Labor’s support for the pact, said Australia had not been threatened by China, whose expanding military presence, he said, was in line with its position as the world’s second superpower.
“What do they expect [the Chinese] to do?” he said. “To move around in row boats? Canoes, maybe? You know, so they develop their own submarines, their own frigates, their own aircraft carriers. They are the other major state in the world. What the Americans say – ‘No, no. Keep your place. Go back to your canoes.’”
His comments came as Richard Marles, the defence minister, and Penny Wong, the foreign affairs minister, have been in Washington for talks about the pact and a new agreement to cover the transfer of nuclear material to Australia under the deal.
Marles said the new agreement was “a very significant step down the Aukus path” and hailed it as another demonstration of the fact “that we are making this happen”.
The new agreement will allow for the transfer of nuclear material to Australia as part of the process of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, and it replaces a pre-existing agreement that allowed “for the exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information”.
Australian government sources have since outlined some of the details of the new agreement, including that it will enable the transfer of Virginia-class submarines from the US from the 2030s. They also said the agreement would pave the way to making Australia’s future SSN-Aukus submarines in South Australia, by enabling the transfer of material and equipment such as “sealed, welded-shut reactors that will not require re-fuelling over the life cycle of the submarine”.
Australian sources insisted that the agreement would not see Australia take spent fuel or high-level radioactive waste from the UK or the US, nor did it require Australia to enrich uranium or process spent nuclear fuel.
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/article/2024/aug/08/aukus-pact-will-turn-australia-into-51st-state-of-the-us-says-paul-keating
Chinese companies are winning the global south
Their expansion abroad holds important lessons for Western incumbents
Source: Hindustan Times and Economist
Since the end of the Cold War, the rich world’s corporate giants have been the dominant force in global commerce. Today consumers and workers in almost every country are touched in some way by the world-spanning operations of multinational firms from America, Europe and, to a lesser extent, Japan. These leviathans are now under threat, as Chinese firms in industries from cars to clothing expand abroad with startling speed. A new commercial contest has begun. Its battleground is neither Chinanor the rich world, but the fast-growing economies of the global south.
The expansion of Chinese business is taking two forms. One is through globalised supply chains. Greenfield foreign direct investment by Chinese firms tripled last year, to $160bn. Much of that was spent building factories in countries from Malaysia to Morocco. Less noticed is the fact that Chinese firms are also pursuing the 5bn consumers who live in the rest of the developing world. Since 2016, listed Chinese firms have quadrupled their sales in the global south, to $800bn, and now sell more there than in rich countries. For the West, attempting to deal with China’s rise, that holds uncomfortable lessons.
Chinese businesses are looking abroad partly because of slowing economic growth and ferocious competition at home. They are chipping away at the dominance of incumbent multinationals everywhere from Indonesia to Nigeria. Transsion, an electronics firm, produces half of the smartphones purchased by Africans. Mindray is the leading supplier of patient-monitoring systems in Latin America. Chinese makers of electric vehicles (EVs) and wind turbines are expanding in the developing world, which also happens to be home to nine of TikTok’s ten biggest markets.
The precise shape of Chinese expansion is, however, a consequence of the policies of governments in the West and China. As rich countries erect trade barriers to keep out Chinese goods, including solar panels and EVs, some Chinese firms are attempting to skirt restrictions by shifting production to the global south. At the same time, selling to emerging markets in their own right has become more attractive, too. The companies’ path has been smoothed by the efforts of China’s government to build diplomatic ties with the global south, notably by facilitating $1trn of infrastructure investment through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As the West has turned inward, China and the rest of the emerging world have drawn closer.
At a time when globalisation is under attack, this holds an important lesson for policymakers: that trade can bring extraordinary benefits. Billions of lives will be enhanced by a wider choice of cheap, innovative and green goods. Transsion’s $100 smartphones mean that some of the world’s poorest people now have at their fingertips all the knowledge and services the internet has to offer. Affordable medical devices will save countless lives. Low-cost climate-friendly technologies make it more likely that developing countries will be able to keep their greenhouse gas emissions in check even as they get richer and their populations grow.
Another lesson is how costly it is to shelter incumbent Western multinationals from competition. Domestic rivalries mean that Chinese firms, once derided for turning out shoddy copycat products, have mastered the knack of producing goods for low-income consumers in a way that Western companies never did. Chinese firms are now at the cutting edge of EVs and batteries, precisely the sorts of industries rich-world governments coddle at home. The idea that Chinese brands lack global appeal has been shattered by companies such as Shein, a fast-fashion firm. Sales by Chinese companies in the global south have already overtaken those of Japanese multinationals. On current trends, they will pull ahead of European firms and be on par with American ones by 2030.
For governments in the global south, the lesson is more subtle. Policymakers in host countries have an opportunity to enrich their own consumers, create jobs, and foster innovation and competition. But to do so they will need to steer between protectionism on the one hand, and passivity on the other.
As in the West, local industries competing with Chinese companies will cite China’s fondness for subsidies and seek special protection. Already, Brazil has introduced tariffs on EVS, and some Chinese exports are facing levies in Indonesia. Yet to shut out Chinese products would deprive consumers of the benefits of choice and innovation, and shield unproductive and stagnant local industries from competition. But policymakers should also beware of being too lax. Some have already been burnt as BRI debts went sour. Much of the business being done by Chinese firms in the global south today involves only final assembly. Many firms are reported to bring in Chinese workers, rather than hire locally. For developing economies to truly benefit, they should press Chinese firms to employ more local workers, share technology and heed local environmental and labour standards.
China may well go along with this. Over the years American and Japanese multinationals saw the benefits of training up local staff and imparting know-how, as they sought to be nearer their end markets, reduce costs and avoid a backlash from angry locals. Chinese firms may similarly come to see the benefits of establishing deeper roots in the emerging world. And just as closer commercial ties enhanced the soft power of America and Japan in the late 20th century, so too may China wield greater influence in the global south.
Cede capital
For decades the West was the world’s fiercest advocate for globalisation. The consequences of its decision to turn inward to shield itself from Chinese competition will take years to become completely clear. But the world is not standing still. Western multinationals have long been the main agents of cross-border trade and investment, and some of the biggest beneficiaries of openness. Today they are surrendering ground in the world’s fastest-growing and most populous markets. China is already reaping the rewards.
